Central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility, its continuous and jump component. by Beine, Michel et al.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
Int. J. Fin. Econ. 12: 201–223 (2007)
Published online 2 April 2007 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.330
CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AND EXCHANGE RATE
VOLATILITY, ITS CONTINUOUS AND JUMP COMPONENTS
MICHEL BEINE
a,J E ´ RO ˆ ME LAHAYE
b,S E ´ BASTIEN LAURENT
b, CHRISTOPHER J. NEELY
c,*
,y and FRANZ C. PALM
d
aUniversity of Luxembourg and Free University of Brussels, Germany
bCeReFiM, University of Namur and CORE, Belgium
cResearch Department, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, USA
dMaastricht University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and CESifo, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
We analyse the relationship between interventions and volatility at daily and intra-daily frequencies for the two major
exchange rate markets. Using recent econometric methods to estimate realized volatility, we employ bi-power variation
to decompose this volatility into a continuously varying and jump component. Analysis of the timing and direction of
jumps and interventions imply that coordinated interventions tend to cause few, but large jumps. Most coordinated
operations explain, statistically, an increase in the persistent (continuous) part of exchange rate volatility. This
correlation is even stronger on days with jumps. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During a period of 20 years (1985–2004), the central banks of the U.S., Japan and Germany (Europe)
intervened more than 600 times in either the DEM–Dollar (DEM/USD or EUR/USD after the
introduction of the Euro) or the Yen–Dollar (JPY/USD) market. On average, they intervened almost three
times per month. It is not surprising that central banks should frequently intervene in markets that are of
crucial importance for international competitiveness. Given the importance of understanding foreign
exchange markets, for scientiﬁc and policy reasons, one would like to assess the impact of central bank
interventions (CBIs hereafter) on exchange rates.
The large empirical literature on the impact of CBIs provides mixed evidence on the impact of CBI on
exchange rate returns. In general, authors fail to identify eﬀects on the conditional mean of exchange rate
returns at a daily frequency (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997). When eﬀects on the spot exchange rate returns
are detected, they are often found to be perverse, i.e. purchases of U.S. Dollar leading to a depreciation of
the Dollar (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Beine, et al., 2002). This perverse result tends to hold for both
unilateral and coordinated interventions. This result has usually been interpreted as indicating a lack of
credibility, or ascribed to inappropriate identiﬁcation schemes in the presence of leaning-against-the-wind
policies (Neely, 2005b). Recent studies conducted at intra-daily frequencies nevertheless ﬁnd that CBIs can
move the exchange rate, at least in the very short run (Fischer and Zurlinden, 1999; Dominguez, 2003).
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rate volatility. Most studies conclude that intervention tends to increase exchange rate volatility (Humpage,
2003) and this result is robust to the use of any of the three main measures of asset price volatility:
univariate GARCH models (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002); implied
volatilities extracted from option prices (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Dominguez, 1998; Galaiti and
Melick, 1999); and realized volatility (Beine et al., 2005; Dominguez, 2006).
This paper looks at the relation between intervention and the components of volatility. We investigate
how CBIs aﬀect the continuous, persistent part of exchange rate volatility and the disconti-
nuous component. Our approach relies on bi-power variation (Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004,
2006) to decompose exchange rate changes into a continuous part and a jump component.
Bi-power variation consistently estimates the continuous volatility even in the presence of jumps (i.e. for
a continuous-time jump diﬀusion process). And the realized volatility (sum of squared intra-daily
returns) consistently estimates the sum of both the continuous volatility and the discontinuities (jumps) in
the underlying price process. Therefore, the diﬀerence between realized volatility and bi-power
variation consistently estimates the contribution to the quadratic variation process due to the
discontinuities (jumps).
Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) suggest that jumps in foreign exchange markets are linked to the
arrival of macroeconomic news, in line with the results of Andersen et al. (2003). In this respect, our
ﬁndings illuminate the importance of interventions for explaining the dynamics of exchange rates and the
extent to which interventions impact rates similarly to macroeconomic news.
Our investigation covers central bank activity on the two largest exchange rate markets. We focus on
Fed, Bundesbank (ECB after 1998) and Bank of Japan interventions over the last 20 years. Using the
method of bi-power variation with 5-min exchange rate data, we identify the days in which exchange rates
jumps occur. This allows us to investigate whether intervention days are associated with the occurrence of
these jumps.
To achieve this goal, we proceed in ﬁve steps.
First, we decompose realized volatility into a continuous component and a jump component. We
investigate the relationship between CBIs and discontinuities in the JPY/USD and USD/EUR markets and
ﬁnd that while jumps are not more likely to occur on days of intervention, the jumps that do occur are
larger than average. In particular, only a few coordinated interventions could reasonably generate jumps.
Coordinated CBIs do predict the smooth, persistently varying component of realized volatility, however.
Second, to check for the direction of causality between jumps and coordinated CBIs, we carefully
study the number of jumps and the timing of their occurrence during the CBI days. Most of the jumps
on CBI days occurred during or after the overlap of European and U.S. markets, when most coordinated
interventions take place. We then examine the direction of the jumps and coordinated CBIs for days
on which they both occur. This analysis strongly suggests that intervention normally generates the jumps,
rather than reacting to them. The only period in which intervention appears to respond to jumps is that of
the ‘Louvre Accords,’ when central banks were very keen to dampen volatility by leaning against the
wind.
Third, to control for the impact of macroeconomic announcements on exchange rate volatility,
we check for the joint occurrence of jumps, coordinated interventions on the corresponding foreign
exchange markets and of macroeconomic announcements. For the JPY/USD, macroeconomic
announcements were made on half of the 14 days where jumps occurred and a coordinated intervention
took place in this market. For the USD/EUR market, macroeconomic announcements occurred
only on three out of 10 days with jumps in the exchange rate and a coordinated intervention. The timing
evidence suggests that a subset of jumps on these days were not the result of macroeconomic
announcements. Instead, some coordinated interventions might be the primary cause of the observed
discontinuities.
Fourth, a formal regression analysis conﬁrms these ﬁndings.
Fifth, we discuss the economic interpretation of the ﬁndings, the implications for foreign exchange
market policy of central banks and some extensions of the methodology.
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of the realized volatilities. Section 3 provides some details on the data. Section 4 reports our empirical
analysis relating the occurrence of jumps with CBIs while Section 5 proposes an interpretation of the main
ﬁndings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. EXTRACTING THE JUMP COMPONENT
Let pðtÞ be a logarithmic asset price at time t: Consider the continuous-time jump diﬀusion process
dpðtÞ¼mðtÞdt þ sðtÞ dWðtÞþkðtÞ dqðtÞ; 04t4T ð1Þ
where mðtÞ is a continuous and locally bounded variation process, sðtÞ is a strictly positive stochastic
volatility process with a sample path that is right continuous and has well-deﬁned limits, WðtÞ is a standard
Brownian motion, and qðtÞ is a counting process with intensity lðtÞ (P½dqðtÞ¼1 ¼lðtÞ dt and kðtÞ¼
pðtÞ pðt Þ is the size of the jump in question). The quadratic variation for the cumulative process
rðtÞ pðtÞ pð0Þ is the integrated volatility of the continuous sample path component plus the sum of the














where rt;D   pðtÞ pðt   DÞ is the discretely sampled D-period return.
1 So 1=D is the number of intra-daily
periods (288 in our application).
In order to disentangle the continuous and the jump components of realized volatility, we need to
consistently estimate integrated volatility, even in the presence of jumps in the process. This is done using
the asymptotic results of Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006).
Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) show that the realized volatility converges uniformly in
probability to the increment of the quadratic variation process as the sampling frequency of the returns









That means that realized volatility consistently estimates integrated volatility as long as there are no jumps.
The realized bi-power variation is deﬁned as the sum of the product of adjacent absolute intra-daily returns










’ 0:79788 is the mean of the absolute value of a standard normally distributed random





Thus, the diﬀerence between the realized volatility and the bi-power variation consistently estimates the
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(7)), we truncate the measurement at zero, i.e.
Jtþ1ðDÞ max½RVtþ1ðDÞ BVtþ1ðDÞ;0 ð 8Þ
One might wish to select only statistically signiﬁcant jumps, to consider very small jumps to be part of the
continuous sample path rather than genuine discontinuities. The Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2004,





1 þ 2m 2
1   5ÞD
R tþ1
t s4ðsÞ ds
q ! Nð0;1Þ ð9Þ
when there is no jump and for D ! 0; under suﬃcient regularity conditions. We need to estimate the
integrated quarticity
R tþ1
t s4ðsÞ ds to compute this statistic. The realized tri-power quarticity measure
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1 þ 2m 2
1   5ÞTQtþ1ðDÞ
q ð12Þ
However, following Huang and Tauchen (2005) and Andersen et al. (2005), we actually implement the
following statistic:
Ztþ1ðDÞ D
 1=2 ½RVtþ1ðDÞ BVtþ1ðDÞ RVtþ1ðDÞ
 1
½ðm 4
1 þ 2m 2
1   5Þmaxf1;TQtþ1ðDÞBVtþ1ðDÞ
 2g 1=2 ð13Þ
Huang and Tauchen (2005) show that the statistic deﬁned in equation (12) tends to over reject the null
hypothesis of no jumps. Moreover, they show that Ztþ1ðDÞ deﬁned in equation (13) is closely approximated
by a standard normal distribution and has reasonable power against several plausible stochastic volatility
jump diﬀusion models. Practically, we choose a signiﬁcance level a and compute
Jtþ1;aðDÞ¼I½Ztþ1ðDÞ4Fa  ½ RVtþ1ðDÞ BVtþ1ðDÞ  ð14Þ
where Fa is the critical value associated with a: Of course, a smaller a means that we estimated fewer and
larger jumps. Moreover, to make sure that the sum of the jump component and the continuous one equals
realized volatility, we impose
Ctþ1;aðDÞ¼I½Ztþ1ðDÞ4Fa  RVtþ1ðDÞþI½Ztþ1ðDÞ4Fa  BVtþ1ðDÞð 15Þ
Finally, still following Andersen et al. (2005), we use a modiﬁed staggered realized bi-power variation
and tri-power quarticity measure to tackle ﬁrst-order autocorrelation due to microstructure noise issues
4:
BVtþ1ðDÞ m 2
1 ð1   2DÞ





4=3ð1   4DÞ
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distribution of the test statistic deﬁned in equation (13) remains asymptotically standard normal once the
relevant components are replaced by the staggered ones.
3. DATA
3.1. Exchange rate data
We analyse the interaction between jumps and interventions for the two major exchange rate markets,
namely the Japanese Yen (JPY) and the Deutsche Mark (DEM) (Euro after 1998) against the US Dollar
(USD). For these two exchange rates, we have about 17 years of intra-daily data for a period ranging from
2 January 1987 to 1 October 2004, provided by Olsen and Associates. The raw data consist of last mid-
quotes (average of the logarithms of bid and ask quotes) of 5-min intervals throughout the global 24-h
trading day. We obtain 5-min returns as 100 times the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logarithmic prices.
Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998b), one trading day extends from 21.00 GMT on day t   1t o
21.00 GMT on date t: This deﬁnition ensures that all interventions dated at day t (using local time) take
place during this interval, even the Japanese interventions that may occur before 00.00 GMT.
It is important to get rid of the trading days that display either too many missing values or low trading
activity. To this aim, we delete weekends plus a set of ﬁxed and irregular holidays.
5 Moreover, we use three
additional criteria. First, we do not consider the trading days for which there are more than 100 missing
values at the 5-min frequency. Second, days where we record more than 50 zero intra-daily returns are
deleted. Finally, we suppress days for which more than seven consecutive prices were found to be the same.
Using these criteria leads us to suppress 48 and 85 days, respectively, for the USD/EUR and the JPY/USD.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the evolution of the exchange rate and the return at a daily frequency over the whole




































Figure 1. Dollar/Euro}daily prices and daily returns.
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from the 5-min intra-daily returns (ﬁrst panel), as described in equation (3), and its decomposition into the
continuous sample path (second panel) and the jump component (third panel), as described, respectively, in
equations (15) and (14). The signiﬁcance of the jump component was assessed using a conservative 99.99%
conﬁdence level, i.e. a ¼ 0:9999:
Tables 1 and 2 describe the realized volatility estimates as well as the estimated jump components for the
USD/EUR and JPY/USD series. These tables also report the proportion of signiﬁcant values over the
whole sample. Two signiﬁcance levels are used. We use ﬁrst a very low level (a ¼ 0:5; variable denoted as J
in the table) for which at least one jump is detected almost every day: the proportion of days with jumps is
above 90% for both markets. The use of such a signiﬁcance level would of course result in an
overestimation of the number of economically meaningful jumps. Therefore, we use a much more
conservative signiﬁcance level (a ¼ 0:9999; variable denoted J9999 in the table) for which the proportion of
days with jumps is much lower (about 10–13% of the business days).
7
3.2. Intervention data
This paper uses oﬃcial data on U.S., German (ECB after 1998) and Japanese interventions provided by
those central banks. The investigation period is similar to sample period for the exchange rate data
(January 1987–October 2004). While oﬃcial data for the Fed and the Bundesbank are available at the daily
frequency for the whole sample, oﬃcial data for the Bank of Japan are available only after April 1991. As a
result, we complement the oﬃcial data set with days of perceived BoJ intervention. The perceived
intervention days are those for which there was at least one report of intervention in ﬁnancial newspapers
(Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times). While this might result in some misestimation of
intervention, this procedure allows us to have similar samples of data for the two exchange rate markets
and makes the comparison easier.
Table 3 reports the number of intervention days for the two FX markets. We distinguish between




































Figure 2. JPY/Dollar}daily prices and daily returns.
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empirical rationales motivate such a distinction. Coordinated interventions are supposed to aﬀect the
market diﬀerently than unilateral operations, as the joint presence of the central banks sends a much more
powerful signal to market participants. This conjecture is supported by empirical studies by Catte et al.
(1992) and Beine et al. (2005) which show that the response of the exchange rate to interventions is much
stronger for coordinated operations.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Jumps and CBIs at the daily frequency
As a ﬁrst step to analyse the impact of CBIs on the two components of realized volatility, one can look at
how often statistically signiﬁcant jumps occur on days of interventions. At this stage, we ignore the question
of causality between exchange rate dynamics and interventions (Neely, 2005b) and simply look at the
proportion of intervention days for which jumps are detected. We will confront the issue of causality
between jumps and interventions later on, through a closer inspection of the intra-daily patterns of these
jumps.
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics for the signiﬁcant jump components extracted on the non-
intervention days on the USD/EUR market (ﬁrst panel) and JPY/USD market (second panel) and on the
















































Jump - alpha = 0.9999
Figure 3. Dollar/Euro}daily RV, continuous component and jumps.
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associated with a coordinated intervention of the two involved central banks (labelled ‘Coordinated
Interventions’). Each part of the table contains three columns corresponding to the signiﬁcant jumps
ðJ9999Þ; continuous volatility ðCC9999Þ and signiﬁcant jumps conditional on a jump day, or in other words
non-zero jumps ðJ999940Þ: In each case, we chose a ¼ 0:9999:















































Jump - alpha = 0.9999
Figure 4. JPY/Dollar}daily RV, continuous component and jumps.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the USD/EUR
RV logðRVÞ JJ 9999
Prop. }} 0.9069 0.1034
Obs. 4360 4360 4360 4360
Mean 0.5577  0.7727 0.07115 0.02575
St. dev. 0.4593 0.5819 0.1761 0.1696
Skew. 5999 0.4120 19.47 22.21
Kurt. 82.48 3999 638.8 763.5
Min. 0.06499  2734 0.0000 0.0000
Max. 10.92 2391 7109 7.109
LB(8) 3942 8476 55.76 4.173
Note: Descriptive statistics for realized volatility (RV), log realized volatility ðlogðRVÞÞ; jumps ðJ;a ¼ 0:5Þ; and signiﬁcant jumps
ðJ9999;a ¼ 0:9999Þ: The rows are: proportion of jumps in the sample, number of observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis, minimum of the sample and maximum. We also provide the Ljung Box statistic LB with eight lags (the number of
lags ¼ logðobsÞ). For a size of 5%, the critical value for the LB test with eight degrees of freedom is 15.51.
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independent of intervention. This result holds both for all intervention days and for the days in which
concerted operations took place. For instance, the proportion of days with signiﬁcant jumps when a
coordinated intervention was conducted by the Fed and the Bundesbank (or the ECB) on the USD/EUR
market is slightly lower (0.094) than the one observed on the non-intervention days (0.104). This suggests
that if interventions aﬀect exchange rate volatility, they are not associated with an abnormal probability of
jumps. Second, while the proportion of jumps on the intervention days is not signiﬁcantly higher, jumps are
bigger when there is an intervention. This is obviously the case for the USD/EUR. The ratios of the size of
jumps between intervention days and non-intervention days are 2.52 and 4.92, for all types of operations
and concerted interventions, respectively. Therefore, while one cannot obviously claim that interventions
systematically create jumps on exchange rates, a subset of these interventions is associated with large
discontinuities in exchange rates. Because the evidence that coordinated intervention is associated with
unusually large jumps is stronger than that for unilateral operations, the subsequent analysis will focus on
such concerted operations.
4.2. Jumps and CBIs: some further causality analysis
The previous results suggest that several jumps occurred, on average, on the day of a coordinated
intervention.
Table 4 identiﬁes 10 and 14 coordinated interventions days for which at least one signiﬁcant jump was
detected at the 0.01% level in the USD/EUR and the JPY/USD markets, respectively. Such preliminary
evidence does not imply that those interventions created the jumps in the FX markets, however, for two
reasons.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the JPY/USD
RV logðRVÞ JJ 9999
Prop. }} 0.9424 0.1339
Obs. 4360 4360 4360 4360
Mean 0.6433  0.6955 0.08284 0.02670
St. dev. 0.7730 0.6636 0.1295 0.1081
Skew. 19.32 0.4597 6621 9.410
Kurt. 727.0 3964 77.92 146.0
Min. 0.04106  3193 0.0000 0.0000
Max. 33.03 3497 2511 2.511
LB(8) 4066 10920000 1337 11.19
Note: Descriptive statistics for realized volatility (RV), log realized volatility ðlogðRVÞÞ; jumps ðJ;a ¼ 0:5Þ; and signiﬁcant jumps
ðJ9999;a ¼ 0:9999Þ: The rows are: proportion of jumps in the sample, number of observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis, minimum of the sample and maximum. We also provide the Ljung Box statistic LB with eight lags (the number of
lags ¼ logðobsÞ). For a size of 5%, the critical value for the LB test with eight degrees of freedom is 15.51.






Note: The table reports the number of oﬃcial intervention days for the Federal Reserve (FED), the
Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). For the Bank of Japan, data before 1 April 1991 are
interventions reported in Wall Street Journal and/or the Financial Times.
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(Kearns and Rigobon, 2005; Neely, 2005a,b), interventions are not conducted in a random way and tend to
react rather to exchange rate developments. This implies that statistical analysis of interventions should
devote special attention to determining the direction of causality. As pointed out by Neely (2005b), this is
particularly important to account for when conducting the investigation at the daily frequency.
The second reason why causal links between interventions and jumps might be spurious is the presence of
macroeconomic announcements. These macroannouncements are known to create jumps in the FX
markets (Andersen et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important to check for the presence of such announcements
on the investigated intervention days.
Jumps and CBIs: intra-daily investigation. One way to investigate the direction of the causality between
jumps and interventions is to look at the intra-daily patterns of these events.
Unfortunately, one cannot obtain the precise times of intervention because such times were not recorded
by the trading desks of most major central banks. Auxiliary information permits this unavailability to be
overcome. One could use the timing of newswire reports of those operations, as proposed by Dominguez
(2006) for Fed interventions. While potentially useful, this approach presents drawback in that it is unclear
whether the timing of the reports is consistent with that of the actual operations. Using real-time data of the
interventions of the Swiss National Bank, Fischer (2005) shows that signiﬁcant discrepancies in terms of
timings emerge between Reuters reports of the interventions and the actual operations of the Swiss
monetary authorities. Some of these diﬀerences are expressed in hours rather than in minutes.
An alternative approach to the use of newswire reports is to start from the stylized fact that most of the
central banks tend to operate within the predominant business hours of their countries (Neely, 2000). An
investigation of the empirical distributions of the reported timings of the Fed, the Bundesbank and the BoJ
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for signiﬁcant jumps ða ¼ 0:9999Þ and the corresponding continuous component of RV
as described in equation (15)
No CBIs CBIs of any type Coordinated interventions
J9999 CC9999 J999940 J9999 CC9999 J999940 J9999 CC9999 J999940
USD/EUR
Prop. 0.1041 }} 0.09328 }} 0.09434 }}
Obs. 4092 4092 426.0 268.0 268.0 25.00 106.0 106.0 10.00
Mean 0.02390 0.5215 0.2295 0.05399 0.6906 0.5787 0.1066 0.8487 1.130
St. dev. 0.1308 0.3728 0.3421 0.4540 0.6541 1.380 0.7096 0.6870 2.045
Skew. 12.15 3.708 4.501 14.23 3.365 4.233 9.185 2.669 2.444
Kurt. 191.6 26.85 26.17 218.4 18.15 20.06 89.73 11.29 7.338
Min. 0.0000 0.06499 0.01821 0.0000 0.08092 0.02400 0.0000 0.1227 0.06627
Max. 2.791 5.141 2.791 7.109 5.271 7.109 7.109 3.964 7.109
JPY/USD
Prop. 0.1319 }} 0.1502 }} 0.1228 }}
Obs. 3874 3874 511.0 486.0 486.0 73.00 114.0 114.0 14.00
Mean 0.02503 0.5938 0.1898 0.04000 0.7987 0.2663 0.03270 0.9041 0.2662
St. dev. 0.1046 0.7364 0.2272 0.1320 0.8446 0.2359 0.1040 0.8282 0.1610
Skew. 10.45 23.89 5.174 4.809 4.320 1.870 3.564 2.895 0.4806
Kurt. 177.5 986.9 41.92 31.31 31.29 6.858 15.96 13.86 2.792
Min. 0.0000 0.04106 0.01962 0.0000 0.05862 0.03101 0.0000 0.1198 0.04015
Max. 2.511 33.03 2.511 1.176 9.164 1.176 0.6315 5.621 0.6315
Note: The three parts of the table correspond, respectively, to days without CBIs, with a unilateral or coordinated intervention and
ﬁnally days associated with a coordinated intervention of both central banks. Note that the third column of each part contains
descriptive statistics for signiﬁcant jumps conditional on a jump day, i.e. the statistics are computed over non-zero jumps. The ﬁrst
panel of the table corresponds to the USD/EUR market and the second to the JPY/USD. The rows are: proportion of jumps in the
sample; observations; mean; standard deviation; skewness; kurtosis; minimum of the sample and maximum.
M. BEINE ET AL. 210
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 12: 201–223 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfeinterventions corroborates this stylized fact (Dominguez, 2006). Furthermore, European and U.S.
monetary authorities reportedly tend to intervene in concert during the overlap of European and U.S.
markets to maximize the signalling content of these operations. This stylized fact is supported by the timing
of Reuters news collected over the 1989–1995 period.
8 Although the timing of the Reuters reports should be
treated cautiously, most coordinated intervention headlines fall within the overlap of the markets,
suggesting that the assumption that coordinated interventions occur in the afternoon European time is
reasonable. This means that, at least for the USD/EUR market, the timing of these jumps can be compared
to this time range. Jumps occurring before the overlap period probably cannot be ascribed to coordinated
interventions. Instead, such jumps might motivate intervention. But, intervention might well cause the
discontinuities observed during the overlap.
Intra-daily timing of jumps. We ﬁrst assume that coordinated interventions occur during the trading
overlap of ﬁnancial markets in Europe and the United States. To get a precise time for the jumps, we ﬁnd
the maximum intra-daily absolute exchange rate return. For both exchange rates (USD/EUR and JPY/
USD), we focus on days on which there was both intervention and a discontinuity in the exchange rate.
Panel 1 of Figure 5 reports the distribution of the time interval with the highest intra-daily return for all the
intervention days (coordinated or unilateral interventions) in the USD/EUR, while Panel 2 gives the same
information but only for days of coordination interventions.
Panel 2 of Figure 5 shows that for seven out of 10 events, the maximum intra-daily exchange rate return
falls within the short overlap period of U.S. and European markets. Therefore, for those seven coordinated
intervention episodes, coordinated operations might have created the jumps. Of course, other events, like
macroannouncements, also might have created the discontinuities. Panel 1 of Figure 5, however, also
includes days of unilateral interventions. In the case of unilateral operations, the central banks can
intervene over the full course of the day because there is no need to coordinate. Interestingly, the
discontinuities were much more dispersed on the days of unilateral intervention. This pattern, that jumps
are more concentrated on days of coordinated interventions, is consistent with the idea that intervention is
related to the jumps.
The same investigation might also be conducted for the intervention days on the JPY/USD market. The
lack of overlap between U.S. and Japanese markets leaves the likely timing of coordinated intervention
ambiguous, however. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we provide the corresponding ﬁgures for
the all-type intervention days as well as the days of coordinated interventions (see Figure 6).
The previous informal timing evidence can be complemented by a more robust statistical analysis of the
intra-daily pattern of the exchange rate returns. The previous analysis neglects the fact that more than one
jump can occur on a particular day. For instance, a second jump on the USD/EUR might occur during the
overlap period, restoring the possibility that coordinated operations between the Fed and Bundesbank
create this jump. Therefore, it is possible that the previous conclusion regarding the causality link for a
couple of interventions is misleading.
Tables 5 and 6 provide additional information with respect to the 10 CBI days where a jump occurred on
the USD/EUR market, and the equivalent 14 days for the JPY/USD. For each date, we report the number
of jumps we identify using the following procedure. If a day is found to contain one or more signiﬁcant
jumps, we neutralize the highest intra-day return (i.e. we ﬁx it to zero) and re-estimate RV and BV. We then
check whether we still observe a statistically signiﬁcant jump quantity. If it is the case, we reiterate the
procedure all over again: we set the second highest intra-day return to zero, re-estimate the jump and so on.
We do so until the BV method fails to reject the null of no jumps. This allows us to identify which
discontinuities contributed to make
P
k2 a statistically signiﬁcant quantity.
9 Tables 5 and 6 provide the
number of signiﬁcant jumps, the timing of the three highest intra-daily returns, the magnitude of
P
k2 and
its ranking in the global unconditional sample.
Table 5 suggests that two of the three intervention days, for which the highest intra-daily return occurred
before the overlap period, had more than one signiﬁcant jump. For these two days (12 February 1991 and
22 September 2000), coordinated interventions during overlap period might have created the second jump,
which occurred during the overlap period. For only one of the 10 days of coordinated interventions
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DOI: 10.1002/ijfe(11 March 1991), there was no signiﬁcant jump during the overlap, which suggests that coordinated
intervention was less likely to produce the jump.
The assumption that coordinated interventions take place only during the overlap is supported by only
tenuous evidence. Coordinated interventions might occur before or after the overlap period, suggesting that
some other type of information should be used. One possibility is to use the timing of the Reuters reports of
interventions for the 10 days for which jumps and interventions were detected on the USD/EUR market.
Nevertheless, the timing of these news reports is available only between 1989 and 1995. Before 1989, we
infer timing of intervention from the level of exchange rate at which the reported intervention took place,
obtained from news reports. Since it is likely that over the full course of the trading day this exchange rate
level will be crossed several times, there are several possible timings for this report. We also must disregard
the days for which multiple jumps were detected, such as 12 December 1992. All in all, we scrutinize four
occurrences to infer the nature of the causal relationship between jumps and interventions.
Table 7 reports the date, the timing of the ﬁrst jump and the timing of the Reuters news for these four
days. For one day, the report of intervention precedes the jump, suggesting that intervention did not react
to this jump. For the three other days, the ﬁrst report of intervention occurs shortly after (within 10 min of)
the jump. The fact that the reports of intervention follow the maximal return so very closely indicates that
the intervention is likely to have preceded the jump and caused it, rather than the other way around. We
believe that the timing evidence is consistent with intervention preceding/causing jumps because CBs need
time to detect the jump, to react and to implement the currency orders. It is diﬃcult to imagine that a CB is

































































































Figure 5. USD/EUR}Fed and BB intervention days (Panel 1: coordinated or unilateral. Panel 2: coordinated) where a jump
occurred. Count of daily maximum intra-day returns per intra-day period. The graph shows, for each intra-day period, how many days
have their maximum intra-day return at the intra-day interval in question. This ﬁgure is available in colour online at
www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/ijfe
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DOI: 10.1002/ijfeable to react in less than 3 min to the occurrence of jumps. Further, there is a lag between intervention and
the time it is reported on the newswire, as documented by Fischer (2005). We believe that the most plausible
interpretation is that intervention preceded and caused the jumps, but was reported after. We ﬁnd it
somewhat less plausible, but possible, that intervention created jumps that were used by traders to detect

































































































Figure 6. JPY/USD}Fed and BoJ intervention days (Panel 1: coordinated or unilateral. Panel 2: coordinated) where a jump
occurred. Count of daily maximum intra-day returns per intra-day period. The graph shows, for each intra-day period, how many days
have their maximum intra-day return at the intra-day interval in question. This ﬁgure is available in colour online at
www.interscience.wiley.com/journal/ijfe
Table 5. USD/EUR}10 days where a coordinated intervention occurred and a discontinuity (
P
k2) is detected
Date # jumps Max #1 time Max #2 time Max #3 time
P
k2 Global rank
1987-12-10 1 13.40 }}1.753219 8
1988-04-14 2 12.40 12.45 } 0.585892 31
1988-09-26 1 13.10 }}0.066267 383
1989-02-03 1 14.35 }}0.394049 59
1989-10-05 1 13.05 }}0.330991 70
1991-02-12 10 9.50 15.40 8.45 0.083371 340
1991-03-11 1 9.35 }}0.218730 122
1992-08-11 1 12.20 }}0.299545 77
1992-08-21 1 13.25 }}0.460832 46
2000-09-22 2 11.15 12.05 } 7.108620 1
Note: For each date, we provide the number of jumps (# jumps), the time at which the three greatest intra-day returns occurred, the
magnitude of the detected jump (
P
k2) and its rank in the global jump ranking (in the unconditional sample).
CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 213
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 12: 201–223 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfeintervention (and to report the CB’s presence in the market). This story is supported by some evidence
provided by Gnabo et al. (2006) for the Yen/Dollar market. While it is again diﬃcult to formally check this
sequence of events with the current data set, the evidence provided here tends to refute a causal relationship
running from jumps to interventions. Of course, given the very small sample, further investigation should
be conducted to examine the possibility of reverse causation, i.e. interventions creating jumps.
Jump sign and intervention direction. This section has shown a relation between jump size and coordinated
intervention. Days of intervention tend to have unusually large jumps (see Table 4) and jumps tend to occur
disproportionately during the same hours that U.S. and Buba interventions are said to take place (see
Figure 5). The direction of causality, if any, remains diputable, however. It is possible that intervention
either reacts to jumps or that intervention causes jumps.
We have one ﬁnal procedure to attempt to determine the likely direction of causality. We can examine the
direction of the interventions and jumps to see if one can informally infer the direction of causality. If
purchases of USD are associated with a jump decline in the value of the USD, that would imply that the
central bank reacted to the jump by leaning against the wind. The alternative inference}that intervention
creates a very sharp perverse movement in the exchange rate}is very implausible. On the other hand, if
purchases of USD are associated with a jump upward in the value of the USD, that would tend to imply
that the intervention caused the jump in the exchange rate. Although one cannot categorically rule out the
possibility that the central banks lean with the jumps, it seems much less likely.
What does the direction of intervention/jumps tell us about causality? Table 8 shows the dates of jumps
and coordinated interventions for the USD/EUR (top panel) and the JPY/USD (bottom panel). The
columns of the table show the date, the maximal intra-day returns and the sign of the intervention (buy or
sell USD). For eight of the 10 observations of the USD/EUR, the data are consistent with intervention
Table 6. JPY/USD}14 days where a coordinated intervention occurred and a jump ð
P
k2Þ is detected
Date # jumps Max #1 time Max #2 time Max #3 time
P
k2 Global rank
1987-04-10 2 12.35 0.10 } 0.310725 102
1987-04-24 1 3.35 }}0.312094 101
1987-11-30 1 0.05 }}0.086187 421
1988-04-14 1 12.45 }}0.424126 51
1988-10-31 3 14.25 8.00 16.20 0.122487 316
1989-09-29 1 0.15 }}0.236308 140
1989-10-05 1 13.20 }}0.337824 85
1989-11-20 1 16.45 }}0.040149 553
1990-01-18 1 13.40 }}0.043575 544
1992-02-18 5 9.35 8.10 0.40 0.196976 181
1994-05-04 1 12.30 }}0.283198 114
1994-11-02 1 16.05 }}0.454362 42
1995-04-03 1 23.55 }}0.631489 23
1995-07-07 11 15.20 12.50 13.40 0.247987 132
Note: For each date, we provide the number of jumps (# jumps), the time at which the three greatest intra-day returns occurred, the
magnitude of the detected jump (
P
k2) and its rank in the global jump ranking (in the unconditional sample).









Note: For each date, we provide the date, the timing of the ﬁrst jump and the timing of the Reuters news.
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with a negative (positive) maximal intra-day return in USD/EUR. The two days which do not ﬁt this
pattern occurred during the ‘Louvre period,’ during which the major aim of central banks was to smooth
volatility, so they were likely to react strongly to jumps. Similarly, for the JPY/USD, in 12 of 14 cases, a
buy (sale) of USD was associated with a positive (negative) return to the JPY/USD.
10 Therefore, we
conclude that an examination of the direction of intervention and jumps is consistent with interventions
normally causing jumps, rather than the other way around.
Macronews announcements. Several empirical studies have documented that macroeconomic announce-
ments can generate jumps in the exchange rates (Andersen et al., 2003; Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard,
2006). These scheduled announcements can induce large swings in the value of the currencies, especially
when the announced value deviates from the market’s expectation. Therefore, it is important to control for
the occurrence of macroeconomic news to isolate the subset of the jumps that could be attributed to CBIs.
Table 9 lists the major types of macroeconomic announcements that can be considered as ‘control
variables’ in our analysis. The table provides details about the days on which the news is released, the units
of measurement and the available sample.
Using the data about these macroannouncements, we can focus on the days of coordinated interventions.
In particular, we can identify on which days major macroeconomic announcements occurred. While it
might be diﬃcult to identify which type of news tends to impact the behaviour of FX traders and the value
of the exchange rates, we can pay some particular attention to news concerning the trade balance as well as
the U.S. exports and imports.
Table 8. For dates of jump and coordinated interventions on the USD/EUR (upper panel) and JPY/USD (lower panel)
markets, we match the magnitude of jump returns with the direction of interventions (buy or sell USD)
Date Max n1 Max n2 Max n3 Intervention sign
USD/EUR
1987-12-10 1:392788 }}buy




1991-02-12  0:171818 0:171641  0:158588 buy
1991-03-11 0:348711 }}sell
1992-08-11  0:643359 }}buy
1992-08-21  0:602769 }}buy
2000-09-22 2:788306 0:973860 } sell
JPY/USD
1987-04-10 0:317013  0:278843 } buy
1987-04-24 0:483136 }}buy
1987-11-30  0:165838 }}buy
1988-04-14  0:540055 }}buy
1988-10-31 0:236184 0:224072 0:199243 buy
1989-09-29  0:345301 }}sell
1989-10-05  0:340885 }}sell
1989-11-20  0:152318 }}sell
1990-01-18  0:130084 }}sell




1995-07-07 0:310470 0:231750 0:231080 buy
Note: that a rise in the USD/EUR means a depreciation of the Dollar and a rise in the JPY/USD means an appreciation of the Dollar.
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jump was detected. We provide the rank of the surprise in the ranking of surprises in absolute value and, in
parenthesis, the magnitude of surprises (in standard deviation). It shows that half of the intervention days
for which we found jumps on the JPY/USD were also days on which macroeconomic announcements were
made. There is nevertheless only one day (14 April 1988) for which some news regarding the trade balance
and U.S. trade ﬂows was released. The timing of the jump on this day is around 12.45 GMT. Turning to the
USD/EUR, we identify three days of coordinated interventions for which macroannouncements occurred.
Interestingly, we found also 14 April 1988 as one of these days and the timing of the jump identiﬁed for the
USD/EUR and JPY/USD are almost the same. On 10 December 1987, the trade balance news was released
at 13:30 GMT and the identiﬁed jump occurs around 13.40 GMT. It seems very likely that the trade
balance announcement generated the jump for this day.
In summary, it appears that major macroeconomic announcements did not generate all of the jumps
identiﬁed on the days of coordinated interventions. Instead, coordinated intervention might have caused
some of these discontinuities. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that this sample is very small, less than
10% of the coordinated interventions. A related question is whether coordinated interventions impact the
continuous component of realized volatility. The next section examines this issue.
4.3. Regression analysis
Up to now, we have investigated the relationship between CBIs and the jump component of the RV. It
seems that CBIs create only a small number of jumps. For instance, out of the 106 coordinated
interventions of the Fed and the Bundesbank, only seven or eight interventions seem to have induced some
jumps on the exchange rate. Although intervention does not create many jumps, the intra-day data do seem
to strongly suggest that some coordinated interventions are very closely related to jumps and are plausibly
the cause of those few jumps.
Most of the previous empirical studies of the impact of CBIs on exchange rate volatility ﬁnd that CBIs
tend to increase exchange rate volatility (see Humpage, 2003 for a recent survey). In particular, Dominguez
(2006) and Beine et al. (2005) ﬁnd that intervention has a strong and robust impact on the realized volatility
of the major exchange rates. The latter paper found that this result holds for concerted interventions, with
impact lasting for a couple of hours. The analysis was carried out using hourly intra-daily returns for the
EUR/USD market and focused on the period ranging from 1989 to 2001. There is disagreement, however,
about whether intervention causes higher volatility, or simply reacts to it. Neely (2005a), for example,
Table 9. Set of available macroannouncements
Announcement Variable name Range Freq. Unit Day of the week
Labour market
Unemployment rate UNEMPLOY 1986–2005 m %Rate Usually Friday
Employees on payrolls NFPAYROL 1986–2005 m Change in 1000 Usually Friday
Prices
Producer price index PPI 1986–2005 m %Change Tuesday to Friday
Consumer price index CPI 1986–2005 m %Change Tuesday to Friday
Business cycle conditions
Durable good orders DURABLE 1986–2005 m %Change Tuesday to Friday
Housing starts HOUSING 1986–2005 m Millions Tuesday to Friday
Leading indicators LEADINGI 1986–2005 m %Change Monday to Friday
Trade balance TRADEBAL 1986–2005 m $ billion Tuesday to Friday
U.S. exports USX 1986–2005 m $ billion Tuesday to Friday
U.S. imports USI 1986–2005 m $ billion Tuesday to Friday
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the structural parameters.
We ﬁrst extend the analysis of the relation of volatility and intervention by regressing logðRVtÞ computed
at 21.00 GMT on the dummies capturing days of interventions as well as a set of day-of-the-week dummies
to capture intra-weekly variation in the volatility of exchange rates.
11 In contrast to Beine et al. (2005), the
estimates of realized volatility are built from 5-min intra-daily returns. Due to the fact that these estimates
of daily volatility include the 288 previous squared returns, the impact of the interventions should be
captured by the daily estimates of volatility even though this impact displays a low degree of persistence.
More formally, we allow for long memory in the volatility process and, following Andersen et al. (1999),
estimate several speciﬁcations of the following ARFIMAð1;d;0Þ model:
ð1   fLÞð1   LÞ
d½logðs2
tÞ m ¼et þ at þ nt þ mt ð18Þ
where s2
t is the daily realized volatility or its continuous component, and d (the fractional integration
parameter), f; m are parameters to be estimated. We control for day-of-the-week seasonal eﬀects through at
at ¼ a1MONDAYt þ a2TUESDAYt þ a3WEDNESDAYt þ a4THURSDAYt ð19Þ
where MONDAYt; TUESDAYt; WEDNESDAYt; and THURSDAYt are day-of-the-week dummies and
for macroannouncements eﬀects through nt
nt ¼y1CPIt þ y2DURABLEt þ y3HOUSINGt þ y4LEADINGIt
þ y5NFPAYROLt þ y6PPIt þ y7TRADEBALt þ y8UNEMPLOYt
ð20Þ
where a1 to a4 and y1 to y8 are additional parameters to estimate. The macroannouncements variables are
the absolute value of the surprise component of the corresponding macroannouncements described in
Section 4.2. Though we control for these variables, we do not report the estimates because that falls beyond
the scope of this paper.
Moreover, we present results for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of mt: First, mt includes binary variable for
unilateral and coordinated interventions of central banks on their respective markets (i.e. we consider
eﬀects of Fed and Bundesbank interventions, unilateral and coordinated, on the USD/EUR, and Fed and
BoJ interventions, unilateral and coordinated, on the JPY/USD):
USD=EUR : mt ¼ b1BBUt þ b2FEDUt þ gCOORDt ð21Þ
JPY=USD : mt ¼ b1BOJUYt þ b2FEDUYt þ gCOORDYt ð22Þ
where b’s and g are parameters to be estimated. BBUt; FEDUt; and COORDt are dummies for unilateral
Bundesbank interventions, unilateral Fed interventions, and coordinated Bundesbank–Fed interventions
on the USD/EUR market, respectively. BOJUYt; FEDUYt; and COORDYt are, mutatis mutandis, the
corresponding dummies for unilateral BoJ interventions, unilateral Fed interventions, and coordinated
BoJ-Fed interventions on the JPY/USD market.
Secondly, we look for a diﬀerent relation of volatility with coordinated interventions on days with and
without signiﬁcant jumps ða ¼ 0:9999Þ: The variables COORDt and COORDYt are thus split into two
parts: COORDJ and COORDYJ for coordinated interventions on jump days, and COORDNOJ and
COORDYNOJ for coordinated interventions on days where no jumps were detected. We then have the
following speciﬁcations for mt:
USD=EUR : mt ¼ b1BBUt þ b2FEDUt þ d1COORDJt þ d2COORDNOJt ð23Þ
JPY=USD : mt ¼ b1BOJUYt þ b2FEDUYt þ d1COORDYJt þ d2COORDYNOJt ð24Þ
where d’s are additional parameters to estimate.
The results for the USD/EUR, reported in the left panel of Table 11, suggest that both unilateral
interventions and coordinated interventions of the Fed and the BB tend to be associated with higher
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interventions, which have an even stronger association with volatility, compared with those associated with
unilateral operations.
The column labelled ‘logðCÞ’ in Table 11 reports the same results for the log of the continuous part of
realized volatility as described in equation (15). These results suggest that this component was related to
intervention. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients and their signiﬁcance are quite similar between the second
and third columns. This suggests that CBIs explain, in a statistical sense, volatility.
The last two columns of each panel of Table 11 report the same results obtained from regressing the log
of realized volatility and the log of the continuous component on the intervention dummies. In contrast to
the previous regressions, the speciﬁcation accounts for a breakdown of coordinated interventions between
those found associated with the jumps (denoted COORDJ in the tables, 10 occurrences) and the remaining
ones (denoted COORDNOJ, 96 occurrences). Coordinated interventions that are potentially associated
with jumps have a strong correlation with realized volatility but a weaker association with continuous
volatility (see the coeﬃcients labelled d1 (COORDJ/COORDYJ)). This conﬁrms the previous ﬁndings that
when CBIs are associated with a jump, the size of the jump is higher and thus the association with realized
volatility is substantial. Coordinated interventions associated with jumps also have some impact on the
continuous part.
The right panel of Table 11 presents the same results for the JPY/USD. Reassuringly, the results are
consistent with those obtained for the USD/EUR. To sum up, we found clear relation between coordinated
interventions, realized volatility and its continuous component. Interventions associated with jumps display
a bigger correlation with realized volatility and still have a relation with continuous volatility.
5. INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR CENTRAL BANK
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET POLICY
The empirical ﬁndings of this paper show that realized volatility of exchange rates between major currencies
is driven by a persistent continuous component and a jump component. The method of bi-power variation
permitted us to decompose realized volatility into these two components (see Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and
Shephard, 2004, 2006; Andersen et al., 2005).
The ﬁndings indicate that the jump component is important in the major foreign exchange markets. Both
macroeconomic announcements and coordinated interventions generate jumps. A more extended study of
the factors that explains the occurrence of jumps would be interesting and relevant from a scientiﬁc point of
view, as well as being potentially useful for hedging applications.
On the whole, the ﬁndings conﬁrm that CBIs are associated with increased exchange rate volatility.
12
Furthermore, there is some evidence that interventions tend to create jumps in the exchange rate volatility.
Intervention does not cause many jumps, but jumps associated with interventions tend to be larger than
normal. As a result, CBIs tend, on average, to be associated with high exchange rate volatility.
Interventions are associated with the continuous part of the volatility process as well. This is conﬁrmed by
the regression analysis, in particular by the striking similarity between the results for realized volatility, as a
dependent variable, and for the continuous component of exchange rate volatility.
The method for decomposing realized volatility into two components yields approximate results. There
may be a remaining part of the jump left in the continuous component. If interventions had in fact been
aimed at attenuating or eliminating jumps only, the ﬁnding that CBIs aﬀect the continuous part could be
due to an approximation error in the decomposition.
From the analysis of the timing of the occurrence of jumps there is much less evidence that the central
banks react to jumps in foreign exchange rates. This ﬁnding indicates that the causation is mostly
unidirectional in the sense that coordinated interventions by central banks aﬀect jumps. But interventions
sometimes appear to produce signiﬁcant discontinuities and are associated with a higher persistent
continuous component of realized volatility.
M. BEINE ET AL. 220
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 12: 201–223 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfeAllowing for diﬀerences in the impact ðdiÞ of interventions between days on which jumps occurred and
days without jumps, a likelihood ratio test concludes that the di’s signiﬁcantly diﬀer for logðRVÞ for the
USD/EUR but do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other for logðCÞ: For the JPY/USD, the di’s do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other for logðRVÞ and for logðCÞ: These ﬁndings suggests that, on both
markets, coordinated CBIs had the same positive association with the persistent part of realized volatility
whether the market was prone to jumps or not. On the USD/EUR market, coordinated CBIs seem to create
jumps that are more than three times as large as those observed on other days.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that unilateral interventions by the Federal Reserve Bank and by the
Bank of Japan are signiﬁcantly positively associated with realized volatility and its continuous component.
Unilateral interventions by the European Central Bank in the USD/EUR market are associated with higher
volatility, but not to a statistically signiﬁcant degree. These results have been obtained while accounting for
macroeconomic announcements, such as the unemployment rate, the number of employees on payroll, the
producer and consumer price index, the durable goods order, the housing starts, the leading indicators and
the trade balance.
The ﬁnding of a positive association of CBIs with market volatility is consistent with predictions from
both the inventory-based approach and the information-based approaches in the microstructure literature.
The inventory-based approach (see e.g. O’Hara, 1995; Lyons, 2001) emphasizes the balancing problem on
foreign exchange markets resulting from (stochastic) inﬂow and outﬂow deviations. Such deviations could
result from a policy intervention. Theory predicts that these deviations will be temporary and last until
portfolios have been rebalanced. The information-based approach focuses on the process of learning and
price formation on markets. In high volatility periods, much trading can take place as informed traders can
easily hide the volume of their transactions. This approach predicts an increase in transactions volume and
volatility following a CBI. Once the intervention news has been revealed, transaction volume, prices and
volatility should revert to their pre-intervention levels. Longer-run eﬀects are related to factors such as
information processing. Turbulent market conditions might require more time to revert to their initial
levels. Our ﬁndings are in line with both theoretical explanations. One should nevertheless realize that both
approaches provide little insight into how long-run adjustment takes place.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the relation between intervention and the continuous and discontinuous (jump)
components of exchange rate volatility in the USD/EUR and the JPY/USD markets. Our study focuses on
days in which there is both coordinated intervention and jumps.
Intervention is not associated with an increased likelihood of jumps at the daily frequency. It is, however,
associated with much larger jumps than normal. Analysis of the timing and direction of discontinuities and
CBIs strongly suggests that interventions normally cause jumps, rather than reacting to them. The period of
the Louvre Accord}during which central banks tried particularly hard to dampen volatility}provided a
couple of exceptions to that rule. In that period, intervention did seem to react to jumps by leaning against
the wind. These results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic announcements in the analysis.
Coordinated CBIs were found to be signiﬁcantly associated with both higher realized volatility and its
continuous component. The reduced form relationship between coordinated intervention and volatility is
even stronger on days with jumps.
The main ﬁnding that interventions are associated with higher exchange rate volatility is consistent with
previous empirical studies and with predictions from the theoretical literature on the inventory-based and
the information-based approaches.
Before drawing strong conclusions about possible unintended adverse eﬀects of CBIs on volatility in
foreign exchange markets it would be sensible to study more deeply the caution issue. Questions which
require more attention are for instance: Do central bank have inside information allowing them to predict
turbulences and act on them on short notice? Would the turbulences/jumps in volatility have been more
severe if central banks had not intervened? Do the jumps}apparently caused by intervention}tend to
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DOI: 10.1002/ijfemove the exchange rate towards longer-run fundamental values, away from those values or are they just
noise? What is the role of macroeconomic announcements in generating turbulences on foreign exchange
markets?
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NOTES
1. We use the same notation as in Andersen et al. (2005) and normalize the daily time interval to unity. We drop the D subscript for
daily returns: rtþ1;1   rtþ1:
2. See also, for example, Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a), Andersen et al. (2001), Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2002a,b), Comte
and Renault (1998).
3. Note that these results rely on the assumption that the joint process of the drift and volatility of the underlying process ðm;sÞ is
independent of the Brownian motion W: This rules out leverage eﬀects and feedback between previous innovations in W and the
risk premium in m: This is empirically reasonable for foreign exchange markets, but not for equity data.
4. Considering ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is suﬃcient in our application.
5. Fixed holidays include Christmas (24–26 December), New Year (31 December–2 January), and July Fourth. Moving holidays
include Good Friday, Easter Monday, Memorial Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and the day after, and July Fourth when it falls
oﬃcially on 3 July.
6. The two ﬁgures are drawn using the ﬁltered data. This means that some business days where the activity and/or the data quality is
low were suppressed. We thus implicitly assume that during these removed days, the exchange rate did not change.
7. While the choice of a (0.9999) for our main results is consistent with the literature, we have investigated how changing a aﬀects the
probability of intervention, conditional on a jump, and found that the inference was not very sensitive to the choice of a:
8. Olsen and Associates provided Reuters headlines for the days of G-3 intervention from 1989 to 1995. Dominguez (2003) previously
used these data for intra-day analysis.
9. We must admit that our procedure to count the number of signiﬁcant jumps in the day is ad hoc and unlikely to be fully rigorous.
Monte Carlo simulations with a jump-diﬀusion GARCH model imply, however, that our method is fairly accurate with fewer than
10 jumps (discontinuities) per day. Therefore, we believe it provides useful information that would otherwise be unavailable with
bi-power variation.
10. Note that the exchange rates are quoted diﬀerently, so a rise in the USD/EUR means a depreciation of the USD but a rise in the
JPY/USD means an appreciation of the USD.
11. The extension of the investigation period is not trivial in the sense that it leads to a big increase in the number of days of
coordinated and unilateral interventions. Indeed, while we observed 58 coordinated interventions over the 1989–2001 period, the
inclusion of 1987 and 1988 leads to the inclusion of 48 additional coordinated interventions. This might be explained by the fact
that this period belongs to the so-called post-Louvre agreement period, during which concerted operations were conducted in order
to get rid of excessive exchange rate volatility.
12. See e.g. Beine et al. (2005), Dominguez (1998) and Dominguez (2003).
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